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1. SUMMARY: Whether an injunction requiring the clean-up 
of a chemical waste stora e facility was a money judgment outside 
the scope of the governmental exemption to the automatic stay 
provision of the Bankruptcy Act. 
2. BACKGROUND: 11 u.s.c. §362(a) (2) provides for an 
automatic stay of the enforcement, against a debtor or against 
property of the estate in bankruptcy, of a judgment obtained 
before the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. Section 
362(b) (5) creates an exception whereby "the enforcement of a 
judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or 
proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental 
unit's police power or regulatory power is not automatically 
stayed upon filing of a bankruptcy petition." 
3. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS: Prior to filing a petition in 
bankruptcy, the debtor resp Kovacs had been engaged in the 
~business of industrial waste disposal in Ohio. In 1979, the 
state of Ohio sued Kovacs as an individual and an officer of 
several businesses for violations of various state environmental 
laws. At that time, Kovacs signed a stipulation and judgment 
order prohibiting him from causing further pollution, requiring 
him to remove hazardous waste from the premises of his company, 
and directing him to pay $75,000 to the Ohio Department of 
Natural Resources. Because Kovacs failed to comply, the state 
court appointed a receiver to collect Kovacs' nonexempt assets 
and use them to finance the cost of clean-up. In July 1980, 
~ Kov~nal petition in bankruptcy in United States 
Bankruptcy Court (S.D. Ohio). In an effort to assure the 
availability of adequate funds to implement the clean-up order, 
Ohio sought a state court hearing on Kovacs' current employment 
status and income. Kovacs thereupon moved the Bankruptcy Court 
to enjoin Ohio . from proceeding in state court under the automatic 
stay provisions of 11 u.s.c. §362. The Bankruptcy Court agreed 
and enjoined the state from proceeding in state court "to levy on 
post-filing wages of the debtor." The DC affirmed, finding that 
... 
the state sought to collect money "just as though it were 
enforcing a money judgment." 
CA 6 affirmed~ curiam. It concluded that while §362(b) 
clearly permitted governmental units to continue to enforce their 
police power through mandatory injunctions despite the filing of 
a bankruptcy petition, it denied them the power to collect money 
in their enforcement efforts. Like the two lower courts, CA 6 
believed that Ohio had returned to state court in pursuit of what 
in essence amounted to a money judgment against Kovacs, which was 
properly subject to the automatic stay. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues the case presents a question 
of "profound importance to the federal, state and local 
governments which are attempting to protect citizens from the 
dangers presented to their health and safety by illegally 
operated chemical waste disposal facilities." Specifically, petr 
argues that the Court of Appeals misapplied the Bankruptcy Act in 
wrongfully preventing a state from exercising its police power to 
abate a public health hazard. Legislative history of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 indicates that Congress was 
concerned that bankruptcy courts not use their authority to 
disrupt the enforcement of statutes adopted pursuant to the 
states' police power to protect public health and safety. 
Accordingly, §362(b) (5), the governmental exemption to the 
automatic stay provisions, was drafted. Unfortunately, the lower 
courts have disagreed as to when the statutory stay is applicable 
against state police power actions. See Petn, p. 10-11. Petr 
alleges a conflict with National Labor Relations Board v. Evans 
Plumbing Co., 639 F.2d 291, 293 (CA 5 1981) (statutory stay does 
not apply against NLRB proceedings): and~ v. First Financial 
Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429 (CA 5 1981) (holding automatic stay 
does not apply against an injunction and order appointing a 
receiver in a federal police power enforcement action). The 
Fifth Circuit's decision makes clear that the use of 
receiverships was a mechanism for implementing injunctive relief 
and should not be considered a money judgment. CA 6 has cut 
against Congress' intent that the automatic stay not apply in 
these circumstances. 
The Solicitor General has filed an amicus brief in support 
of petr. 1 The SG argues that the meaning of money judgment for 
purposes of S362(b) (5) does not extend to injunctions which 
entail the expenditure of money for their performance. In such 
~- cases, the government's foremost aim is to protect the public 
health, not to enhance the public fisc. 2 Pennsylvania and 14 
other states have also filed an amicus brief urging a grant. 
They note that the decision below has already been cited by other 
courts in blocking state police power efforts. See In re Penn 
Terra, Ltd., No. 82-845 (W.D. Pa., Nov. 4, 1982): United States 
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 81-2990 (D. N.H., Nov. 15, 
1The interest of the United States is that the decision 
below may be used to cripple its own environmental enforcement 
efforts under a number of federal laws. 
2The state and the United States recognize that the 
$75,000 payment provided for in the judgment order is a money 
judgment subject to the automatic stay provisions. 
1982). Moreover, the decision below cuts against the Tenth 
Amendment, 11 u.s.c. §543(c) (1), which obli~ates a bankruptcy 
court to protect Ohio from the receiver's inability to carry out 
his obligations, and 28 u.s.c. §959(b), which provides that a 
receiver shall manage property in his possession according to 
requirements of valid state laws. Amicus also argue that the 
decision below was an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power 
by non-Art. III judges. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. 
Marathon Pipeline Co., 103 S.Ct. 199 (1982). 
Resp argues first that the case is moot because on September 
17, 1982 the DC entered its decision affirming the Bankruptcy 
Court's determinatation that resp's obligations under the 
injunction were dischargable in bankruptcy. Consequently, petr 
would be unable to seek to collect the post-petition personal 
earnings of the debtor even if the decision of CA 6 on the 
automatic stay were reversed by this Court. On the merits, resp 
argues that this case is of limited importance because it does 
not involve a corporate debtor or business reorganization under 
Chapters 11 or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, but rather involves a 
Chapter 7 proceeding for an individual debtor. Moreover, it does 
not involve that portion of the stipulation in judgment entry 
requiring resp to stop polluting. Resp then seeks to distinguish 
cases cited by petr. In NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Co., supra, the 
Court noted that "should it be necessary to enforce the judgment 
for backpay, a different question would be presented. We express 
no opinion as to whether an action to execute or enforce a money 
judgment would be exempt from the automatic stay." 639 F.2d, at 
293. SEC v. First Financial Group of Texas, supra, did not 
require payment of moneys by the debtor and ,only allowed the 
government agency to implement injunctive relief by preventing 
future violations of the law through the appointment of a 
receiver. Resp contends that CA 6 correctly found that the state 
court order appointing the receiver could not be distinguished in 
substance from a money judgment because of its requirement that 
the receiver obtain all nonexempt assets of the debtor as well as 
any sums of money which would become payable to the debtor in the 
future. The state fails to accept that a court order may be both 
an injunction and a money judgment. 
Resp also suggests that Congress, in reshaping the 
Bankruptcy Act to compl!Y with Northern Pipeline, may change 
substantive provisions, such as the automatic stay sections. 
4. DISCUSSION: (1) Mootness. If resp is correct that the 
case is moot, then the decision below should be vacated so that 
. . 
it will not carry any precedential effect. United States v. 
Muns ingwe ar, Inc. , 340 U·.S. 36 (19 50) • This rna tte r might, 
however, fall under the "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review" exception. Unless petr responds to the mootness 
suggestion in a reply brief, I recommend calling for such a 
response. 
(2) On the merits, the issue of whether an injunction which ,----
requires seizure of a debtor's funds is a money judgment for 
purposes of the automatic stay provi~s of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act is certworthy. Although resp is fairly persuasive in 
distinguishing the allegedly conflicting CA 5 decisions, the 
~ 
decision below has already been relied upon in several courts to 
block similar exercises of police power. Because it is not clear 
that Congress intended the automatic stay provision to apply in 
these circumstances, and because of the important interests of 
both the United States and a number of states in the matter, if 
the case is not moot, I would recommend a grant.3 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I suggest calling for a response from 
petr on the question of mootness. 
There is a response and two amicus briefs. 
December 21, 1982 Singer Opinion in Petition 
ME 
I 
3The Art. III problem concerning the bankruptcy courts 
should not in any way affect this case, given that Northern 
Pipeline is limited to purely prospective effect, and because, 
contrary to resp' s suggestion, there is no reason to believe that 
Congress will in response to that decision change the automatic 
stay provisions. 
Court ................... . 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . 





l•oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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~~ 
OHIO Cert to CA6 (Kennedy, Wellford, 
McRae [DJ]) 
v. ~~~ 
KOVACS (bperator of 
waste ilaump) Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs challenge the decision of the courts 
below that certain liabilities of resp under a state-court 
injunction were dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Resp Kovacs had been 
engaged in the business of industrial waste disposal in Ohio. In 
- ~ -
1979, the State of Ohio sued Kovacs as an individual and as the 
officer of several business entities, including the Chem-Dyne 
Corp., for alleged violations of various state environmental laws. 
a stipulation and consented to entry of an order 
prohibiting him from causing further pollution, requiring him to 
remove all hazardous wastes from the premises of the Chem-Dyne 
Corp. by July 1980, and directing him to pay $75,000 to the Ohio 
of Natural Resources. When resp failed to comply, the state 
court appointed a receiver to collect resp's nonexempt assets and 
use them to finance the cost of cleanup at the Chem-Dyne site. 
Subsequently, in July 1980, resp filed a Chapter 11 petition 
for personal bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the Southern District of Ohio. In re Kovacs, Bankr. No. B-1-80-
1499. By order of the Bankruptcy Court, the proceedings were 
converted to Chapter 7 proceedings in September 1980. In an 
effort to ensure the availability of adequate funds to implement 
the cleanup order, Ohio sought a state court hearing on resp's 
current employment status and income. Resp moved in Bankruptcy 
Court to enjoin Ohio from proceeding in state court, arguing tht 
the State's goal was to obtain an order permitting the state-court 
receiver to use his post-bankruptcy income to satisfy the unfilled 
obligation to clean up the Chem-Dyne site and that such an order 
would violate the automatic stay provision of 11 u.s.c. §362. The 
Bankruptcy Court granted the injunction . 
. I~ ~ 
On appeal, both th~ DC and the CA6 affirmed. The CA6 
concluded that, while §362(b) clearly permitted governmental 
units to continue to enforce their police power through mandatory 
~ - ---
injunctions despite the filing of a bankruptcy petition, it denied 
them the power to collect money in their ~nforcement efforts. 1 
The CA6 also found that Ohio was pursuing in state court what "in 
essence" amounted to a money judgment against resp. Thus, the 
--------------------------State's action was properly subject to the automatic stay. 
Subsequently, bhio petitioned this Court for cert. 2 In 
response to that petition, resp argued that the stay appeal was 
moot because the DC had recently affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's 
determination that resp's obligation to comply with the injunction 
was dischargeable in bankruptcy. Assuming resp's liability under 
~ 
the state-court injunction was dischargeable, petr would be unable 
to seek to collect the post-petition personal earnings of resp 
even if the decision of the CA6 with respect to the stay was 
reversed. In reply, Ohio argued that its petition was not moot 
because the bankruptcy Court's determination of dischargeability 
was erroneous and could be reversed on the appeal of that decision 
then pending before the CA6. This Court granted Ohio's petition 
for cert, vacated the judgment of the CA6, and remanded the case 
- ---- ---;====.======:::::=-. 
to the CA6 for consideration of the question of mootness 'n light 
'-----
of the pending dischargeability appea1. 3 --Upon considering the 
111 U.S.C. §362(b) (5) provides that "the enforcement of a 
judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action 
proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental 
unit's police power or regulatory power is not automatically 
stayed upon filing of a bankruptcy petition." 
·- 2rn its cert petition, the State conceded that the $75,000 
payment provided for in the state-court judgment order was a 
money judgment subject to the automatic stay provisions. 
Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages. 
dischargeability appeal, the CA6 affirmed the DC and Bankruptcy 
~- ---. 
Court's determinations of dischargeability~ expressly relying on 
its holding in Kovacs I that "injunctions which require the 
performance of acts which necessitate the expenditure of money are 
really money judgments." 
In the present cert petition, Ohio challenges the judgment of 
the CAG with respect to the dischargeability appeal. The CA6's 
consideration of the mootness issue remains pending before it. It 
is petr's assumption that the CA6 is awaiting the Court's action 
on this cert petition before determining whether its 
dischargeability decision makes Kovacs I moot. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr (and~ as amicus curiae) : 4 The CAG 
decision effectively releases resp from a mandatory injunction 
designed to protect public health and safety. In both Kovacs I 
and this case, the CA6 eviscerated the difference between a 
dischargeable right to payment for a breach of performance and a 
"-------------.........__.,._ 
nondischargeable right to enforce an injunction that entails the 
expenditure of money. The consequence is that a pre-existing 
obligation to clean up a hazardous waste disposal site has been 
wholly excused. This result encourages polluters to abuse the 
Bankruptcy Code and defy state and federal environmental 
protection laws. Because of the great number of dumpsites 
3The action concerning the stay issued by the Bankruptcy 
Court is hereafter to as Kovacs I. 
4A group f 30 States have also filed an amicus brief in 
support of petr. 
·" 
·. 
urgently requiring cleanup and the limited funds available to 
' 
state and federal governments for the purpose, any rule that 
excuses the responsible polluter from performing cleanup work has 
grave consequences. 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, only two classes of claims are 
dischargeable in bankruptcy: (1) any right to payment; and (2) a 
right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such 
breach itself gives rise to a right to payment. 11 u.s.c. 
§101(4). Thus, a mandatory injunction will only be dischargeable 
if the breach may be remedied either by an injunction or by a 
right to payment. Such is not the case here, for, as the DC 
acknowledged, the Ohio statutes that authorized the state court to 
order resp to remove and dispose of the industrial and hazardous 
wastes did not provide the State with an alternative right to 
money payment. The CA6 made no contrary finding, but suggested 
that the State may pursue other remedies against resp, such as 
penalties and criminal sanctions. Penalties and sanctions are not 
, •' 
alternative remedies, but are enforcement mechanisms. 
The CA6 vastly oversimplified the situation here and took the 
view that if the injunction entails the expenditure of money, then 
it must be a right to payment, which is a dischargeable claim. 
When the thrust of the government's action is not to collect money 
damages from the debtor but rather to protect the public health 
and safety, then the government does not stand in the shoes of an 
ordinary creditor and the bankrupt's obligation to comply with an 
order requiring him to abate health and environmental dangers may 
not be voided in bankruptcy. Many environmental injunctions 
- b -
entail the expenditure of money for their performance. A 
defendant may be ordered to fund a study to determine the extent 
of the threat posed by its waste disposal practices, to remove 
leaking drums of toxic wastes that threaten to contaminate 
groundwater, or to remove industrial wastes previously deposited 
in navigable waters. In each case, when the government seeks to 
enforce the order, its aim is to protect the public health, not to 
enhance the public fisc. 
Here, the state court's orders were preventive, not 
compensatory. Initially, resp was ordered to clean the dumpsite. 
Only when there was a showing that resp had not complied did the 
court order resp to release certain assets and future earnings to 
the court-appointed receiver. Although the order directed the 
payment of money by resp to the receiver, the receivership was 
established for the limited purpose of implementing the cleanup 
order. Accordingly, the order must be distinguished from a 
traditional money judgment. 
The present decision expressly builds on Kovacs I. 
Therefore, it is relevant to note that the CA6 decision in Kovacs 
l is at odds with the approach followed by other courts in 
deciding whether governmental enforcement actions fall within an 
exemption to the automatic bankruptcy stay. See NLRB v. Evans 
Plumbing Co., 639 F.2d 291, 293 (CAS 1981) (reinstatement order 
/\ Jr exempt from bankruptcy stay even though tantamount to an order to 
~~~~egin paying wages); Commonwealth v. Peggs Run Coal Co., 55 Pa. 
Lr~ Commw. 312, 423 A.2d 765 (1980) (action brought by state seeking 
mandatory injunction ordering compliance with environmental 
x\ 
~~ 
statutes and posting of bond to ensure compliance not attempt to 
enforce money judgment and thus exempt from automatic bankruptcy 
stay). The CA6's decision in the present case cannot be 
reconciled with the decisions of several other courts that have 
consistently held that a bankrupt defendant's obligation to pay 
criminal restitution -- whether ordered by another court before or 
after the petition in bankruptcy-- survives discharge. E.g., 
United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d 216 (CAS 1982); In re Newton, 15 
Bankr. 708 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981). The rationale in these cases -focuses on the fact that the government's action is undertaken in 
the public interest -- whether it be to protect the public by 
' 
deterring criminal conduct or to rehabilitate criminal offenders 
-- not on the fact that the resulting order requires a bankrupt to 
The same analysis should have been applied in the 
present case, for the government's action was undertaken in the 
public interest to protect public health and safety. 
Resp: Resp contends that the cleanup of the waste dump 
ordered by the state court was completed as of December 22, 1983, 
three days after the cert petition was filed in this case. Resp 
has attached to his response an affidavit from Kenneth E. 
Zimmerman, Resident Engineer, United States Army Corps of 
Engineers, supporting his contention that the cleanup is complete. 
The State phrased the issue in this case as whether "the 
obligation to comply with the injunctions imposed upon Debtor 
Kovacs by the Butler County Court of Common Pleas to cleanup the 
Chem-Dyne waste storage site" is dischargeable. The debtor's 
obligation under the state court order was to assist the receiver 
in the cleanup of the Chem-Dyne facilities. Inasmuch as the 
cleanup has been completed, so that all obligations of the debtor 
pursuant to the state court order have been satisfied, the State 
of Ohio would be unable to pursue any remedies against resp in the 
event that this Court were to overrule the decision of the CA6 and 
hold that the debtor's obligations under the state court decision 
were nondischargeable. Therefore, the case is moot. There is 
nothing in the record to suggest that the underlying issue here is 
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." Because the case has 
become moot, it should be remanded to the CA6 with directions to 
vacate the judgments of the DC and the Bankruptcy Court and to 
remand the case for dismissal. See Great Western Sugar Co. v. 
Nelson, 442 u.s. 92 (1979). 
If the case is not moot, cert should be denied because it 
does not present an important question of federal law and there is 
no conflict among the circuits. The case does not involve any 
question pertaining to the ability of the federal, state, and/or 
local governments to protect the health and safety of their 
citizens. Instead, the case involves the efforts of Ohio to 
collect money from an individual debtor and Ohio's attempt to 
cloud its efforts to enforce a money judgment by the facade of 
arguing that it is attempting only to require the assistance of 
the debtor in cleaning up the Chem-Dyne facilities. The only type 
of performance the State sought from resp was payment of money. 
Petr has been unable to point to any other decision in 
conflict with the decision of the CA6. Further, petr has not 
shown that anything about the decision below requires intervention 
' ' 
':1 - ---
of this Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers. 
' 4. DISCUSSION: Resp makes a strong argument that the case 
is moot since the dumpsite has now been cleaned. It is not clear, 
however, from either resp's representations or the affidavit, 
exactly how the cleanup of the dumpsite was financed. If the 
State paid for the cleanup, it may attempt to seek reimbursement 
from resp. A continuning controversy over reimbursement may not 
e enough to save the present suit from mootness, for whatever 
cause of action the State may have may not be grounded on the 
state-court order appointing a receiver, which is the order at the 
heart of this litigation. 5 
Petr has not responded to resp's allegation of mootness. I 
~recommend that the Court ~1 for a reply on the is~of 
~s. If resp is correct that the case is moot, then the 
decision of the CA6 should be vacated and remanded with 
instructions to vacate the DC and Bankruptcy Court judgments. 
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 u.s. 36 (1950). 
If it is not moot, the issue raised by petrs appears to be an -important one with potentially far-reaching effects. Although 
there is no square conflict, the issue is so significant that I 
think it merits this Court's attention. In the cert petition in 
Kovacs I, resp noted that several lower courts had followed the 
5since the State conceded in Kovacs I that the $75,000 
payment provided for in the state-court order was a money 
r/ judgment, I am assuming that the State is not contesting the dischargeability of that liability. Therefore, resp's payment or nonpayment of that liability is irrelevant to whether or not 
there is still a live controversy here. 
.,>, 
lead of the CAG. Because environmental cleanup efforts could be 
severely hampered if polluters were allowed to evade their court-
ordered responsibilities, I recommend a GRANT if the case is not 
moot. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I suggest calling for a reply on 
mootness. If the case is moot, the Court should issue a 
the case is not moot, I recommend ~~ 
two amicus briefs have been filed .. 
/ 
Februa·ry 8, 1984 Durand Opn in petn 
'· 
., 
'"*o ['A-&~ . ..::ftvc ~ 'tA.<_) ~~ ~~ 
L ~ ( 1¥. t - <6) . ~J ~ 
_/\_t_l ~ .,{ 1-o ()<_ d_ ~ ._;_;__._ J<_~~  • 
L/1__ 
~~~ February 29, 1984 
RE: Ohio v. Kovacs No. 83-1020 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Cammie 
The reply brief on the mootness issue is in and the 
state makes a convincing argument that the case is not moot. The 
state court injunction ordered Kovacs to conduct a cleanup to 
remove all the waste material in the soil and groundwater around 
the site. Kovacs never complied with the injunction. Although ----------------
the state has removed the hazardous and industrial wastes from 
the surface of the site, the underground wastes remain. More-
over, because Kovacs v.iolated a court-ordered injunction, 
------------------------------ --
the 
reply brief professes a desire to do so, but the bankruptcy 
court's statutory stay and determination of dischargeability pre-
vent this action. Thus, there are ~wo live iss~n the state's 
challenge to the bankruptcy court's order: (1) Kovacs' duty under 
the state court injunction to abate the continuing water pollu-
tion by removing the waste material that still remains on the 
site: and (2) Kovacs' liability for his contempuous disregard of 
the state court's injunction. 
Because the issue is not moot and is important, I recom-
mend a GRANT. 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 .. . 
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No. 83-1020, State of Ohio v. Kovacs 
Memorandum to File 
This is a summary memo on the basis of a preliminary 
reading of the briefs. 
The only question presented is whether an injunction 
issued by a state court requiring appellee Kovacs to clean 
up a hazardous waste storage site is a "debt" or "claim" 
under §523 of the Bankruptcy Act that is dischargeable in 
Kovacs' Title 11 bankruptcy? 
This case was here before on the question whether, 
O?C 
in this same bankruptcy proceeding, the state order to clean 
up the waste was exempt from the "automatic stay provision" 
of §362 of the Act? Both the DC and CA 6 held that the state 
order was not exempt. Ohio appealed the case to our Court. 
We vacated the judgment and remanded to determine whether 
a discharge order had made the case moot. On remand, the 
case was found not to be moot. 
The i~now before us is whether Kovacs' identical 
obligation under the state court judgment is nondischargeable. 
The Bankruptcy Court and CA 6 held that the state order is a 
"claim" within the meaning of that term in §523. Therefore, 
it is dischargeable. 
' . 
No. 83-1020, State of Ohio v. Kovacs 2. 
The DC held that the "law of the case", established in 
Kovacs I, doctrine applied. The question of discharge was 
viewed as identical with the question of an automatic stay. 
CA 6, however, held that the "law of the case" doctrine was 
inapplicable since we had vacated the prior judgment. CA 6 
noted that Kovacs "cannot personally clean up the waste 
he wrongfully released into Ohio waters ... except by 
paying money or transferring over his own financial 
resources." It observed that the State of Ohio "acknowledged 
this by its steadfast pursuit of payment as an alternative 
to personal performance." Accordingly, the state order 
was found to be a "claim" and therefore dischargeable. 
* * * 
Perhaps we should have summarily affirmed CA 6 rather than 
Noting this appeal. I do not find the briefs of either of the 
parties particularly well written. The brief on behalf of the 
State of Ohio argues that the state court injunction order to 
clean up the waste was entered pursuant to a compromise settle-
ment entered in the state court receivership that preceded the 
bankruptcy. Such an order, Ohio argues, was an equitable 
remedy to abate an environmental contamination. Any expenditure 
of money made by Kovacs to comply with the order was simply 
a means of compliance with an equitable obligation rather 
than paying of a claim or a debt . 
. .. 
No. 83-1020, State of Ohio v. Kovacs 3. 
The brief of appellee injects a new factual situation 
into the case. It states that: 
"As of December 22, 1983 the total surface 
cleanup of the facility was completed, and 
no chemical, container, or other items 
holding chemicals or other wastes remain 
on the site." 
The brief states that the cost of the cleanup was 
paid from funds of the United States Corps of Engineers 
under a "superfund" established for the purpose. The 
brief also states that "part or all of this cost was 
recouped by the United States through settlements obtained 
from toxic waste generating companies named as defendants 
in another lawsuit." Br. p. 5. 
Accordingly, as the third point in its brief (see 
III), appellee argues that the obligation of Kovacs to 
remove the toxic waste "has been performed and this case 
is, therefore, moot". It is further stated that "any claim 
for indemnity belongs to the United States - not to the 
State of Ohio. 
Curiously, this argument of mootness is advanced as 
only the third argument on behalf of appellee. His princi-
pal argument continues to be that the claim was equitable, 
and therefore not a debt or a claim. 
* * * 
No. 83-1020, State of Ohio v. Kovacs 
If we have to decide the bankruptcy question, I am 
inclined to go along with the analysis of the courts below. 
I do not want a full bench memo or even a long bobtail bench 
memo. In view of the possible mootness, the case now may 
not present a justiciable issue. Its importance certainly 
seems to have diminished. I would like my clerk's view as 
to the legal question whether an equitable claim of the kind 
that can be discharged only by the payment of money, is a 
dischargeable claim - as the court below held. 
L.F.P. 
4. 




To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Dan 
Re: Ohio v. Kovacs, No. 83-1020. 
This is the case concerning whether a state order to 
clean up toxic wastes is dischargeable in bankruptcy. It is 
scheduled for oral argument on Wednesday, Oct. lOth. The State 
of Ohio has just submitted a reply brief which does not affect 
the merits but does possibly affect the mootness issue; i.e., 
whether all that the state court order commands has been per-~ 
formed. 
Kovacs contends that the case is moot because the u.s. ----------· ----..,___-----
government, as part of a Superfund clean-up operation, has re-
moved all the wastes covered by the order. Until now, the State 
had claimed that the order covered not only surface wastes, which 
the Superfund operation removed, but also subsurface wastes, 
which it did not. As I pointed out in my memo, however, this 
argument is unpersuasive. Now for the first time the State has 
-"" 
changed its argument. It now argues that the subsurface wastes 




surface until after the Ohio court issued its clean-up order • 
.,. 1 c;;a.. ...., ............... -- ... ... ., -
~After this point, the State cla1ms, Kovacs dumped the sur face 
7\ ---- -
chemicals into the ground in a cynical attempt to comply with the 
,.,-- ' . '"'----" ..__ '"------- ~ 
court~ s removal directive. 
If Ohio is right, the order has probably not been com-
plied with, and the case is probably not moot. One must wonder, 
though, why Ohio has waited until now to make this argument if it 
is indeed true. In any event, the issue is definitely worth pur-
suing at oral argument. If Kovacs agrees that he dumped wastes 
covered by the order into the ground after the order issued, then 
the Court should probably proceed to the merits. If he does not 
agree, the Court should try to find out what happened, perhaps by 
remanding to the CA6 for consideration of mootness. 
I~ 7jJI- A)'-~r ~L-V ~. fA/ 
dro 08/24/84 ~ ~~ , 
lJ.~ ~~ '--'--' ~-~~ ¢-~ LAH.. 
Dan 
~ ' 
~ ~~gL~"tLDc4&, ~ 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
No. 83-1020 
Ohio v. Kovacs 
August 24, 1984 
Question Presented 
Whether a state court judgment entry requiring resp to 
clean up certain toxic wastes is a "debt" or "claim" discharge-
able in bankruptcy. 
I. Background 
A. Statutory Background. 
With certain exceptions not at issue here, the Bank-
ruptcy Code discharges a debtor from "all debts that arose before 
the date of the order for relief . . . , and any liability on a 
claim ••• as if such claim had arisen before the commencement of 
the case II 11 u.s.c. §727 (b) (emphasis added). The Code 
defines "claim" and "debt" as follows: 
"In this title--
* * * 
(4) "claim" means--
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is re-
duced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, 
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or 
, (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of perform-]~~ 
ance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, ~ ~
whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is 
reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-
tured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured; 
* * * 
(11) "debt" means liability on a claim 
§101 (4), (11). 
II 11 u.s.c. 
This case concerns the proper interpretation of the underlined 
language in §101 ( 4) (B) . 
B. Facts and Decisions Below. 
Resp operated a hazardous waste disposal facility in 
Ohio. In 1976, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency and 
Dept. of Natural Resources instituted pollution proceedings in 
state court against him and others. Resp settled this suit by 
signing a stipulation and judgment entry which, among other 
.. 
.. 
things, ordered him to stop causing water and air pollution and 
to remove certain wastes from the premises. By Feb. 1980, resp 
had fallen behind the clean-up schedule and the state court ap-
pointed a receiver to do the job. 
V" 
In July 1980, resp filed a Chapter 11 petn for personal 
v 
bankruptcy, which the BC converted to Chapter 7 in Sept. 1980. 
Later, the State asked a state court to determine resp's current 
employment status and income. Resp moved the BC to stay these 
state proceedings. The BC, believing the state court motion to 
be only a preliminary to a request for the state court to apply 
resp's income to the clean-up, stayed the state court proceedings 
under the Code's automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. §362. TheriA)~ 
DC and CA6 upheld the stay, but on Jan. 24, 1983 this Court va- ~~ 
cated and remanded for consideration of mootness. The Court ap- •. 
~hu-_·· 
parently believed that the DC and CA6 decisions in a later (the 
present} case might have mooted the stay controversy. The CA6 --------------
appears to be waiting for this Court to decide the present case 
before hearing the stay remand. 
IL 11 
The present case arose when the State asked the BC to 
hold several of resp's obligations under the judgment entry--in 
particular, his duty to stop polluting and to clean up the 
premises--to be nondischargeable. The BC held, however, that the 
obligations were dischargeable as "claims" because resp could 
per form them only by paying money. On appeal, the DC and CA6 
affirmed. Following the BC, the CA6 reasoned that these obliga-
tions amounted to a money judgment, which everyone agrees is dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy. It explained its decision as follows: 
"Ohio is essentially seeking to obtain a money payment 
from Kovacs. The impact of its attempt to realize upon 
Kovac's income or property cannot be concealed by le-
gerdemain or linguistic gymnastics. Kovacs cannot per-
sonally clean up the waste he wrongfully released into 
Ohio waters. He cannot perform the affirmative obliga-
tions properly imposed upon him by the State court ex-
cept by paying money or transferring over his own fi-
nancial resources." Ohio v. Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984, 988 
(CA6 1983), cert. granted, 104 s.ct. 1438 (1984). 
This Court granted cert and the United States and approximately 




Resp contends now, as he did in his cert petn, that the 
case is moot. The federal "Superfund" program, he claims, re-
moved all the wastes covered by the judgment entry before cert 
was even filed. Any action against him now, he believes, belongs 
to the United States or to the clients of his who contributed to 
the "Superfund" clean-up costs, not to the State of Ohio. These 
others are not parties in this case. 
The State answers that the case is still live for three 
reasons: ( i) because the "Superfund" program cleaned up only 
surface wastes, leaving resp still responsible for those below 
the surface, (ii) because resp is still "causing pollution" in 
violation of the judgment entry, and (iii) because the state can-
not seek criminal contempt against resp as long as the BC deci-
sion remains in effect. 
All three reasons appear invalid. Although the CA6 has 
twice characterized the judgment entry as requiring the clean-up 
of "all" wastes at the dump site, Id., at 985; Ohio v. Kovacs, 
681 F. 2d 454, 454 {CA6 1982) {per curiam) , vacated and remanded 
for consideration of mootness, 103 s.ct. 810 {1983), it appears 
to have misconstrued the entry. The judgment entry does not ac-
-~---~-~
tually appear to require the clean-up of subsurface wastes. The 
relevant order, Order 3, requires resp "to remove and dispose of 
all industrial wastes and/or other wastes as described in Finding 
No. Seven {7) ...• " App. to Pet. for Cert. A-46. Finding No. 7, 
in turn, states: 
"{7)The Defendants currently estimate that 
they have the following amounts of industrial wastes 
and/or other wastes stored at their facilities 
••• :850,000 gallons in liquid form and 4,000 barrels of 
solid or semisolid sludges." Id., at A-45 {emphasis 
added). --
This language describes only "stored" wastes, not contaminants 
that have leached into the soil. These dispersed subsurface 
wastes can hardly be said to be "stored" in the ordinary sense of 
the word. Furthermore, the description of the amount and type of 
waste further argues against the State's view. It would be odd 
indeed to characterize dispersed wastes in the subsoil as "gal-
lons" of liquid or "barrels" of solid matter or sludge. In 
short, the "Superfund" clean-up appears to have done all that 
Order 3 requires of resp. 
Resp also appears not to be "causing pollution" in vio-
lation of the judgment entry. Order 1 states: 
"{1) The Defendants and their employees and 
agents are permanently enjoined and restrained from 
causing 'pollution,' as that term is defined in Section 
6111.0l{A) of the Revised Code, of 'waters of the 
state,' as that term is defined in Section 6111.0l{H) 
of the Revised Code." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-46. 
Although the ~ admits that resp is no longer disposing of 
wastes improperly, it argues that resp "causes pollution" within 
the terms of the order whenever it rains and wastes previously 
dumped into the ground seep into the water table. 
There are two difficulties with this argument. First, 
the BC held that "it is clear that the negative injunctions, to 
refrain from causing water pollution etc. • • • I are mooted since 
defendant is not in possession of the premises, since a receiver 
has been installed there." Id., at A-20. The State failed to 
appeal this finding at ~ level below and does not really argue 
against it now. 
Second, the State reads Order 1 quite expansively. 
Under the State's view, a violation occurs not only when someone 
actually dumps waste, but also everytime it rains and long-
abandoned wastes seep into the water system. It seems more natu-
ral, however, to assume that "causing" refers to the actual dump-
ing of wastes, not to the leaching of them from the soil into the 
water system. The leaching, but not the dumping, is beyond 
resp's control. Furthermore, the State's interpretation of these 
terms does not comport satisfactorily with Ohio law. Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. §6111. 04 states: "No person shall cause pollution or 
place or cause to be placed any sewage, industrial waste, or oth-
er wastes in a location where they cause pollution of any waters 
of the state " This section distinguishes between causing 
pollution and placing wastes in a location where they in turn 
cause pollution. If this distinction has any meaning, it must be 
that acts, like resp's, of dumping wastes into the ground where 
t.: 
they can later seep into the water table constitute "plac [ ing] 
waste[s] in a location where they cause pollution," not 
"caus[ing] pollution" itself. Also, the State's broad interpre-
tation could create potentially unlimited liability under Ohio 
law. Section 6111.07 makes "each day of violation •.. a separate 
offense" which §6111.09 makes punishable by a "civil penalty of 
not more than ten thousand dollars." The State's view would im-
pose the penalty each day waste seeps from the soil into the 
water table, not only each day waste is dumped into the soil. 
Although thorough investigation of any legislative history might 
indicate otherwise, common sense suggests that the penalty was 
not meant to work this way. 
As a third reason why the case presents a live contro-
versy, the State simply asserts that the BC order prevents it 
from seeking criminal contempt sanctions against resp. I do not 
understand, however, how the order ties the State's hands. The 
BC decision merely held the judgment entry's obligations to be 
dischargeable. It did not stay any present or future state court 
proceedings. 1 It is unclear, moreover, what the State would base 
criminal contempt on. Resp appears to be violating no order at 
this time. 
1The BC's earlier decision did, of course, stay state court 
proceedings, but those state court proceedings concerned the col-
lection of money from resp, not criminal contempt. The Bankrupt-
cy Code's stay provision, moreover, specifically prohibits stays 
"of the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or pro-




Both sides agree that the only question is whether the 
judgment entry gives the State a "right to an equitable remedy 
for breach of performance [that] gives rise to a right to 
payment •..• " 11 u.s.c. §101(4) (B). If it does, the obligation 
it creates is dischargeable; otherwise it is not. Although the 
answer is certainly not clear-cut, on balance I think that the JJ~ 
obligation is not dischar eable because it involves neither a 
"breach of performance" nor a "right to payment." 
~ ___.,-
The State and resp offer two different interpretations 
of the "breach of performance" language of §101 (4) (B). The~ 5~? 
~~~L..4y 
reads the statute as implicitly distinguishing between breaches 
of "performance" and breaches of "legal duty." In its view, the -- -
only , equitable remedies that the statute makes dischargeable are 
It \ \ 
those for breaches of contractual obligations, not for obliga-
tions otherwise imposed by law. Resp, on the other hand, reads 
the statute as implicitly distinguishing between obligations to 
act and those not to act. The former, he believes, whether con-
tractually or otherwise created, give rise to breach of perform-
ance, while the latter do not. In the context of this particular 
case, his distinction boils down to the traditional distinction 
--------~-----~------
between mandatory and prohibitory orders. He would find the for-
mer, but not the latter, dischargeable. 
Of these two interpretations, I find the State's more 
l L '" 
persuasive. For one thing, the use of the word "performance" 
along with "breach" follows traditional contract usage. -------- -- For an-~ ~
other thing, there is support elsewhere in the Code for believing ~­
~-
., 
that Congress viewed statutory duties differently. Section 
523 (a) (7), for example, exempts from discharge any debt "to the 
extent such a debt is a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to 
and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensa-
tion for actual pecuniary loss other than a tax penalty •••• " 
Id. For another, the distinction between mandatory and prohibi-----·----._. -----...,..__._  __..... ________ ......_ 
tory injunctions is somewhat slippery and formalistic. It is 
nearly always possible to view either type of order in terms of ~ 
the other by, for example, wording a command not to act in a cer-
tain way as a positive command to act differently. Furthermore, 
I can find no support--policy or otherwise--for this distinction --------in the Code. For purposes of bankruptcy, the "style" of the 
order appears irrelevant. 2 
The judgment entry also does not satisfy the second ~ 
;)~~ 
requirement of §101 ( 4) (B) that it "give rise to a right to pay~ , 
ment." The legislative history, while not absolutely conclusive, ~A..:/ 
included a "right to an equitable remedy 
bill, the term "claim" &.-
'~/..,/-
for breach of perform- .La 
supports this view. In the original House 
ance if such breach does not give rise to a right to payment~ 
II H. R. 8200, 95th Cong. , 1st Sess., p. 3 ( 1977) (emphasis 
added). The committee report noted how broad a definition this 
was: 
2Resp also argues that even if the Court believes the term 
"breach of performance" refers only to contractual duties, there 
was such a breach in this case. He rests this remarkable argu-
ment on the belief that the judgment entry is nothing but a pri-
vate contract. The fact that both parties agreed to the judgment 
entry, however, makes it no less an order of the court. 




"The definition also includes as a claim an equitable 
right to performance that does not give rise to a right 
to payment. By this broadest possible definition .•• , 
the bill contemplates that all legal obligations of the 
debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be 
able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case. It per-
mits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy 
court." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. , 1st Sess., 
p. 309 (1977). 
The Senate, however, recoiled from so broad a defini-.____ __ 
Its bill, in fact, deleted all references to equitable 
remedies from the definition of "claim" and restricted that term 
exclusively to rights to payment. 
When the House then considered the Senate bill, the 
House sponsor, Representative Edwards, proposed the eventually 
enacted language as a compromise. He explained the compromise as 
follows: 
Section 101 (4) (B) represents a modification 
of the House-passed bill to include [in] the definition 
of 'claim' a right to an equitable remedy for breach of 
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to 
payment. This is intended to cause the liquidation, or 
estimation of contingent rights of payment for which 
there may be an alternative equitable remedy with the 
result that the equitable remedy will be susceptible to 
being discharged in bankruptcy. For example, in some 
states a judgment for specific performance may be sat- 1 
isf'ed b an alternative right to payment, in Efie event t 
that performance 1s re use : 1n a e ent the creditor 
entitled to performance would have a 'claim' for pur-
poses of a proceeding under title 11. 
On the other hand, rights to an equitable reme-
dy for breach of performance with respect to which such 
breach does not give rise to a right to payment are not 
'claims' and would therefore not be susceptible to dis-
charge in bankruptcy." 124 Cong. Rec. 32350, 32393 
(1978) (emphasis added). 
The Senate later accepted the House definition. 
These statements, particulary the last, all suggest that --- -~---, 
Congress intended to discharge equitable obligations only when 
there was an alternative right to damages. Of course, as petr 
points out, Representative Edwards's statement does not actually 
say that the House definition was intended to provide for liqui-
dation of equitable remedies only when an alternative damages 
remedy exists, but this does seem the most reasonable conclusion. 
Such a view, in effect, forces the election between alternative 
remedies that is dischargeable. 
Resp argues, however, that the language "gives rise to a 
right to payment" covers more than just situtations in which an 
alternative damages remedy exists. In his view, an obligation is 
dischargeable so long as it requires ~ kind of payment. Resp 
argues this position along two different lines. First, he claims 
that any injunction requiring an expenditure--no matter how 
small--"gives rise to payment." This, however, proves too much. 
As the CA3 noted recently in a very similar case: "[A]lmost ev-
erything costs something. An injunction which does not compel 
some expenditure or loss of monies may often be an effective nul-
lity." Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dept. of Environmental Resources, 733 
F.2d 267, 278 (CA3 1984). The only virtue of this interpretation 
is its consistency with resp's earlier interpretation of "breach 
of performance." Since it costs money to do almost anything and 
only doing nothing can possibly be said to be costless, resp is 
again putting forward the distinction between mandatory and pro-
hibitory orders. But again, this distinction is largely formal-
istic. Prohibitory orders are rarely costless: stopping from 
doing one thing often requires spending money to do something 
else. 3 
Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages. 
Resp also argues that the presence of a receiver neces-
sarily means that any breach of performance gives rise to a right 
to payment. His point is that his obligation now consists not of 
cl~ning up t~e Eremi~s, but only of havin the receiver 
to clean them up. Breach of this new obligation, he believes, 
can give rise only to a right to payment. 
Even if resp is technically correct, it seems odd that 
the receiver should make any difference. After all, the state 
court appointed him only because it found that resp had acted in 
"flagrant disregard of the Stipulation and Judgment Decree." 
App. to Pet. for Cert. A-54. His appointment merely bifurcated 
resp's existing duty. Although resp's primary duty was to clean ----
up the premises, there was of course the underlying duty to spend -the money necessary to do so. He could not fulfill the first 
duty without fulfilling the other. The receiver's appointment 
merely placed the duty to clean up in the receiver while leaving 
the duty to pay in the resp. It did not create any new duties or 
change the nature of those that already existed. In this view, 
the appointment of a receiver makes at most a technical differ-
ence in the nature of the duty involved. Furthermore, holding 
that this technical difference makes the obligation dischargeable 
would have the unfortunate effect of encouraging parties to de-
3Resp admits that a small class of mandatory orders violate 
this distinction. These orders, commands to act that the indi-
vidual can perform by himself without spending money, are so 
rare, he argues, that they can be safely ignored. In any case, 
he adds, his obligation does not fall into this category. 
~ . 
fault on their obligations. If an obligation is dischargeable 
when a receiver is appointed but not otherwise, obligors will 
have every incentive not to perform their duties and to act in 
bad faith. 
III. Summary. 
Since the Superfund program has already cleaned up all 
the wastes apparently covered by the order, the case is most 
likely moot. Any cause of action against resp for the clean-up 
lies with the United States or the firms that helped pay for it, 
not with the State. 
On the merits, the obligation imposed by the judgment 
entry is not dischargeable. It meets neither of §101 ( 4) (B) 's 
requirements for a "claim." First, resp's failure to observe it 
does not constitute a "breach of performance," but rather a 
breach of legal duty. Second, the breach does not "give rise to 
a right to payment." The legislative history indicates (although 
not conclusively) that the breach must give rise to an alterna-
tive right to payment. It is not enough that the remedy requires 
spending money. 
IV. Recommendation. 
I would find the case moot and vacate and remand with 
instructions for the CA6 to vacate the decisions below it. See 
--------· 
United States v. Munsingwear, 340 u.s. 36 (1950). I would not 
recommend that the Court simply vacate and remand for consider-
ation of mootness, for two separate panels of the CA6 have al-
ready misconstrued the critical provision of the judgment entry. 
In each case, they have simply assumed that it applies to all 
wastes even though the order itself speaks of only "stored" 
wastes. 
If the Court wants to reach the merits, I would reverse 
the CA6. The statutory language and policy and the legislative 
history all suggest that Congress did not intend for obligations 
like this one to be dischargeable in bankruptcy. Furthermore, 
resp has not made an adequate showing that Congress intended to 
preempt the traditional state police powers involved here. This 
type of preemption should not be lightly inferred. 
Of the two possible grounds of reversal--that the obli-- -------·-----------·-------
~ gation does not involve a "breach of performance" and that it 
does , not "give[] rise to a right to payment"-- I would recommend 
-------------------~--·-~----
reversing on the second. The presence of legislative history on 
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~ ~ MEMORANDUM /J ~ 
c~~......u~~~ 
~ .. r~-~ 
JUSTICE POWELL F-f ~ .. 
From: Dan ~~-~/ 
Re: Mootness of Ohio v. Kovacs, No. 83-1020. 
Resp contends now, as he did in his cert petn, that the 
case is moot because the federal "Superfund" program has removed 
all the wastes covered by the judgment entry. Any action against 
him now, he believes, belongs to the United States or to the eli-
ents of his who contributed to the "Superfund" clean-up costs, 
not to the State of Ohio. These others are not parties in this 
case. 
Until it filed its reply brief, the State argued that 
the case was still live for three reasons: ( i) because the 
"Superfund" program cleaned up only surface wastes, leaving resp 
still responsible for those below the surface, ( i i) because resp 
is still "causing pollution" in violation of the judgment entry, 
and (iii) because the state cannot seek criminal contempt against 
resp as long as the BC decision remains in effect. In its reply 
brief, the State added another reason. 
claimed that 
I \ 
resp dumped some of the 
For the first time, it 
\ 
surface wastes into the 
, . . , 
., 
t .• 
ground after he agreed to the judgment entry. Interestingly, the 
State did not even mention this at oral argument. 
If resp did not dump surface wastes into the soil after 
he agreed to the entry, all of the State 1 s arguments against 
mootness appear invalid. Although the CA6 has twice character-
ized the judgment entry as requiring the clean-up of "all" wastes 
at the dump site, Id., at 985; Ohio v. Kovacs, 681 F.2d 454, 454 
(CA6 1982) (per curiam) , vacated and remanded for consideration 
of mootness on other grounds, 103 s.ct. 810 (1983), it appears to 
have misconstrued the entry. The judgment entry does not actual-
-------------~----- ~ ~ 
ly appear to require the clean-up of subsurface wastes. The rel-
evant order, Order 3, requires resp "to remove and dispose of all 
industrial wastes and/or other wastes as described in Finding No. 
Seven (7) " App. to Pet. for Cert. A-46. Finding No. 7, in 
turn, states: 
"(7)The Defendants currently estimate that 
they have the following amounts of industrial wastes 
and/or other wastes stored at their facilities 
••• :850,000 gallons in liquid form and 4,000 barrels of 
solid or semisolid sludges." Id., at A-45 (emphasis 
added). ---
This language describes only "stored" wastes, not contaminants 
that have leached into the soil. These dispersed subsurface 
wastes can hardly be said to be "stored" in the ordinary sense of 
the word. Furthermore, the description of the amount and type of 
waste further argues against the State 1 s view. It would be odd 
indeed to characterize dispersed wastes in the subsoil as "gal-
lons" of liquid or "barrels" of solid matter or sludge. In 
short, the "Superfund" clean-up appears to have done all that 
"'~"\-"-
Order 3 requires of resp--assuming that he did not dump the 
-~ 
stored wastes into the soil after he agreed to the judgment en-
try. If he did, he would probably still be in continuing viola-
tion of Order 3 and the case would not be moot. 
Resp also appears not to be "causing pollution" in vio-
lation of the judgment entry. Order 1 states: 
"(1) The Defendants and their employees and 
agents are permanently enjoined and restrained from 
causing 'pollution,' as that term is defined in Section 
6lll.Ol(A) of the Revised Code, of 'waters of the 
state, ' as that term is defined in Section 6111.01 (H) 
of the Revised Code." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-46. 
Although the State admits that resp is no longer disposing of 
wastes improperly, it argues that resp "causes pollution" within 
the terms of the order whenever it rains and wastes previously 
dumped into the ground seep into the water table. 
There are two difficulties with this argument. First, 
the BC held that "it is clear that the negative injunctions, to 
refrain from causing water pollution etc. . . . ' are mooted since 
defendant is not in possession of the premises, since a receiver 
has been installed there." Id., at A-20. The State failed to 
appeal this finding at ~ level below and does not really argue 
against it now. 
Second, the State reads Order 1 quite expansively. 
Under the State's view, a violation occurs not only when someone 
actually dumps waste, but also everytime it rains and long-
abandoned wastes seep into the water system. It seems more natu-
ral, however, to assume that "causing" refers to the actual dump-
ing of wastes, not to the leaching of them from the soil into the 
water system. The leaching, but not the dumping, is beyond 
resp's control. Furthermore, the State's interpretation of these 
. ' ,, 
' . •, 
'· J. 
.... 
terms does not comport satisfactorily with Ohio law. Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. §6111.04 states: "No person shall cause pollution or 
place or cause to be placed any sewage, industrial waste, or oth-
er wastes in a location where they cause pollution of any waters 
of the state " This section distinguishes between causing 
pollution and placing wastes in a location where they in turn 
cause pollution. If this distinction has any meaning, it must be 
that acts, like resp's, of dumping wastes into the ground where 
they can later seep into the water table constitute "plac [ ing] 
waste[s] in a location where they cause pollution," not 
"caus[ing] pollution" itself. Also, the State's broad interpre-
tation could create potentially unlimited liability under Ohio 
law. Section 6111.07 makes "each day of violation ••• a separate 
offense" which §6111.09 makes punishable by a "civil penalty of 
not more than ten thousand dollars." The State's view would im-
pose the penalty each day waste seeps from the soil into the 
water table, not only each day waste is dumped into the soil. 
Although thorough investigation of any legislative history might 
indicate otherwise, common sense suggests that the penalty was 
not meant to work this way. 
As a final reason why the case presents a live contro-
versy, the State simply asserts that the BC order prevents it 
from seeking criminal contempt sanctions against resp. I do not 
understand, however, how the order ties the State's hands. The 
BC decision merely held the judgment entry's obligations to be 
dischargeable. It did not stay any present or future state court 
proceedings. The Bankruptcy Code's stay provision, moreover, 
. ' 
specifically prohibits stays "of the commencement or continuation 
of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor." 11 
u.s.c. §362. And even if the BC could stay contempt proceedings, 
it is unclear what the State would base crimina! contempt on. 
Resp appears to be violating no order at this time. 
I would recommend vacating the judgment of the CA6 for 
consideration of mootness and allowing it in turn to remand the 
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From: Justice White 
DEC 1 7 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
OHIO v. WILLIAM EE KOVACS, DBA B & W 
ENTERPRISES, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[December -, 1984] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Pe_!illQper State of Ohio obtained ~ injunction ordering 
respondent William Kovacs to clean up a hazardous waste 
site. receiver-wa8Subsequently appointed. Still later, 
Kovacs filed a petition for bankruptcy. The question be-
fore us is whether, in the circumstances present here, 
Kovacs' obligation under the injunction is a "debt" or "lia-
bility on a claim" subject to discharge under the bankruptcy 
code. 
I 
Kovacs was the chief executive officer and ::;tockholder of 
Chem-Dyne Corporation, which with other business entities 
operated an industrial and hazardous waste disposal site in 
Hamilton, Ohio. In 1976, the State sued Kovacs and the 
business entities in state court for polluting public waters, 
maintaining a nuisance, and causing fish kills, all in violation 
of state environmental laws. In 1979, both in his individual 
capacity and on behalf of Chem-Dyne, Kovacs signed a stipu-
lation and judgment entry settling the lawsuit. Among 
other things, the stipulation enjoined the defendants from 
causing further pollution of : he air or public waters. forbade 
bringing additional industrial wastes onto the site. required 
the defendants to.remove specified wastes from the pronerty, 
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and ordered the payment of $75,000 to compensate the State 
for injury to wildlife. 
Kovacs and the other defendants failed to comply with 
their obligations under the injunction. The State then ob-
tained the appointment in state court of a receiver, who was 
directed to take possession of all property and other assets of 
Kovacs and the corporate defendants and to implement the 
judgment entry by cleaning up the Chem-Dyne site. There-
ceiver took possession of the site but had not completed his 
tasks when Kovacs filed a personal bankruptcy petition. 1 
Seeking to develop a basis for requiring part of Kovacs' 
post-bankruptcy income to be applied to the unfinished task 
of the receivership, the State then filed a motion in state 
court to discover Kovacs' current income and assets. 
Kovacs requested that the bankruptcy court stay those pro-
ceedings, which it did. 2 The State also filed a complaint in 
the bankruptcy court seeking a declaration that Kovacs' 
obligation under the stipulation and judgment order to clean 
up the Chem-Dyne site was not dischargeable in bankruptcy 
1 Kovacs originally filed a reorganization petition under chapter 11 of the 
bankruptcy code, 11 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. , (1982) but converted the peti-
tion to a liquidation bankruptcy under chapter 7. See 11 U. S. C. § 1112 
(1982). 
2 The bankruptcy court held that the requested hearing was an effort to 
collect money from Kovacs in violation of the automatic stay provision. 
See 11 U. S. C. § 362. It entered a specific stay as well. The District 
Court affirmed, ruling that Ohio was trying to enforce a judgment obtained 
before filing of the bankruptcy petition. The Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit also found the hearing barred. In re Kovacs, 681 F. 2d 454 
(1982). In that court's view, while § 362(b) allowed governmental units to 
continue to enforce police powers through mandatory injunctions, it denied 
them the power to collect money in their enforcement eiforts. Because of 
the later filing by Ohio of a complaint to declare that Kovacs' obligations 
were not claims under bankruptcy, we granted certiorari, vacated the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded to that court to consider 
whether the dispute over the stay was moot. -- U. S. -; 103 S. Ct. 
810 (1983). As far as we are advised, the Court of Appeals has taken no 
action on the remand. 
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because it was not a "debt,"-a liability on a "claim," within 
the meaning of the bankruptcy code. In addition, the com-
plaint sought an injunction against the bankruptcy trustee to 
restrain him from pursuing any action to recover assets of 
Kovacs in the hands of the receiver. The bankruptcy court 
ruled against Ohio, as did the District Court. The Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Ohio essentially 
sought from Kovacs only a monetary payment and that such a 
required payment was a liability on a claim that was dis-
chargeable under the bankruptcy statute. We granted cer- ) 
tiorari to determine the ~rg~abi].ty o!_Kovacs' obligation 
under the affirmative injunction entered against him. 
II 
Kovacs alleges that the Army Corps of Engineers, using 
funds recovered from those concerns that generated the 
wastes, has removed all industrial wastes from the site and 
that if he has an obligation to pay those expenses, the obliga-
tion is owed to the United States, not the State. Kovacs 
urges that the case is therefore moot. The State argues that 
the case is not moot because the removal of the barrels and 
wastes from the surface did not satisfy all of Kovacs' obliga-
tions to clean up the site; it is said that the ground itself 
remains permeated with toxic materials that must be re-
moved if further pollution of the public waters is to be 
avoided. We perceive nothing feigned or frivolous about the 
State's submission. Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 57 
(1968). The State surely has a stake in the outcome of this 
case, United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 
U. S. 388, 397 (1980), which in our view is not moot. We 
proceed to the merits. 
III 
Except for the nine kinds of debts saved from discharge by 
11 U. S. C. § 523(a), a discharge in bankruptcy discharges 
the debtor from all debts that arose before bankruptcy. 
§ 727(b). It is not claimed here that Kovacs' obligation under 
83-102~0PINION 
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the injunction fell within any of the categories of debts ex-
cepted from discharge by § 523. Rather, the State submits 
that the obligation to clean up the Chem-Dyne site is not a 
debt at all within the meaning of the bankruptcy law. 
For bankruptcy purposes, a debt is a liability on a claim. 
§ 101(11). A claim is defined by § 101(4) as follows: 
"(4) 'claim' means-
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is 
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, 
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or 
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of perform-
ance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, 
whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is 
reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-
tured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured;" 
The provision at issue here is § 101(4)(B). For the purposes 
of that section, there is little doubt that the State had the 
right to an equitable remedy under state law and that the 
right has been reduced to judgment in the form of an injunc-
tion ordering the cleanup. The State argues, however, that 
the injunction it has secured is not a claim against Kovacs 
for bankruptcy purposes because (1) Kovacs' default was a 
breach of the statute, not a breach of an ordinary commercial 
contract which concededly would give rise to a claim; and (2) 
Kovacs' breach of his obligation under the injunction did not 
give rise to a right to payment within the meaning of 
§ 101(4)(B). We are not persuaded by either submission. 
There is no indication in the language of the statute that 
the right to performance cannot be a claim unless it arises 
from a contractual arrangement. The State resorted to the 
courts to enforce its environmental laws against Kovacs and 
secured a negative order to cease polluting~ an affirmative 
order to clean up the site and an order to pay a sum of money 
to recompense the State for damage done to the fish popula-
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tion. Each order was one to remedy an alleged breach of 
Ohio law; and if Kovacs' obligation to pay $75,000 to the state 
is a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy, which the State freely 
concedes, it makes little sense to to assert that because the 
clean-up order was entered to remedy a statutory violation, 
it cannot likewise constitute a claim for bankruptcy purposes. 
Furthermore, it is apparent that Congress desired a broad 
definition of a "claim" 3 and knew how to limit the application 
of a provision to contracts when it desired to do so. 4 Other 
provisions cited by Ohio refute, rather that support, its 
strained interpretation. 5 
The courts below also found little substance in the submis-
sion.that the clean-up obligation did not give rise to a right to 
payment that renders the order dischargeable under § 727. 
The definition of "claim" in H. R. 8200 as originally drafted 
would have deemed a right to an equitable remedy for breach 
of performance a claim even if it did not give rise to a right to 
payment. 6 The initial Senate definition of claim was nar-
rower/ and a compromis~ version, § 101(4), was finally 
adopted. In that version, the key phrases "equitable rem-
edy," "breach of performance," and "right to payment" are 
not defined. See 11 U. S. C. § 101. Nor are the differences 
3 H. R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977); S. Rep. No. 989, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978). See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, 1!101-.04, at 
101-16.2 (15th ed. 1984). 
• See 11 U. S. C. § 365 (1982) (assumption or rejection of executory con-
tracts and leases). 
6 Congress created exemptions from discharge for claims involving pen-
alties and forfeitures owed to a governmental unit, 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(7), 
and for claims involving embezzlement and larceny. I d., § 523(a)(4). If a 
bankruptcy debtor has committed larceny or embezzlement, giving rise to 
a remedy of either damages or equitable restitution under state law, the 
resulting liability for breach of an obligation created by law is clearly a 
claim which is non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
6 H. R. 8200 (House Committee Print), 95th Cong., 1st Sess., (1977), as 
reported September 8, 1977, 309-310. 
7 See S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., (1977), as introduced October 31, 
1977, 299. 
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between the successive versions explained. The legislative 
history offers only a statement by the sponsors of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act with respect to the scope of the provision: 
"Section 101(4)(B) ... is intended to cause the liqui-
dation or estimation of contingent rights of payment for 
which there may be an alternative equitable remedy 
with the result that the equitable remedy will be suscep-
tible to being discharged in bankruptcy. For example, 
in some States, a judgment for specific performance may 
be satisfied by an alternative right to payment in the 
event performance is refused; in that event, the creditor 
entitled to specific performance would have a "claim" for 
purposes of a proceeding under title 11." 8 
We think the rulings of the courts below were wholly consist-
ent with the statute and its legislative history, sparse as it is. 
The Bankruptcy Court ruled as follows, In re Kovacs, 29 
Bankr. Rep. 816 (Bankr. SD Ohio 1982): 
"There is no suggestion by plaintiff that defendant can 
render performance under the affirmative obligation 
other than by the payment of money. We therefore 
conclude that plaintiff has a claim against defendant 
within the meaning of 11 U. S. C. § 101(4), and that de-
fendant owes plaintiff a debt within the meaning of 11 
U. S. C. § 101(11). Furthermore, we have concluded 
that that debt is dischargeable." 9 
8 124 Cong. Rec. H11089 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ed-
wards); see also 124 Cong. Rec. S17406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of 
Sen. DeConcini). 
9 More fully stated, the Bankruptcy Court's observations were: 
"What is at stake in the present motion is whether defendant's bank-
ruptcy will discharge the affirmative obligation imposed upon him by the 
Judgment Entry, that he remove and dispose of all industrial and/or other 
wastes at the subject premises. If plaintiff is successful here, it would be 
able to levy on defendant's wages, the action prevented by our Prior Deci-
sion, after defendant's bankruptcy case is closed and/or the stay of 11 
U. S. C. § 362 as interpreted by our Prior Decision is no longer in force. 
· ..... 
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The District Court affirmed, primarily because it was bound 
by and saw no error in the Court of Appeals' prior opinion 
holding that the State was seeking no more than a money 
judgment as an alternative to requiring Kovacs personally to 
perform the obligations imposed by the injunction. To hold 
otherwise, the District Court explained, "would subvert Con-
gress' clear intention to give debtors a fresh start." App. to 
Pet. for Cert. A-16. The Court of Appeals also affirmed, re-
jecting the State's insistence that it had no right to, and was 
not attempting to enforce, an alternative right to payment: 
"Ohio does not suggest that Kovacs is capable of person-
ally cleaning up the environmental damage he may have 
caused. Ohio claims there is no alternative right to pay-
ment, but when Kovacs failed to perform, state law gave 
a state receiver total control over all Kovacs' assets. 
Ohio later used state law to try and discover Kovacs' 
post-petition income and employment status in an appar-
ent attempt to levy on his future earnings. In reality, 
the only type of performance in which Ohio is now inter-
The parties have crystallized the issue here in simple fashion, plaintiff 
stoutly insisting that the just identified affirmative obligation is not a mon-
etary obligation, while defendant says that it is. The problem arises, of 
course, because it is not stated as a monetary obligation. Essentially for 
this reason plaintiff argues that it is not a monetary obligation. Yet plain-
tiff in discussing the background for the Judgment Entry says that it ex-
pected that defendant would generate sufficient funds in his ongoing busi-
ness to pay for the clean-up. Moreover, we take judicial notice that 
plaintiff sought discovery with respect to defendant's earnings, the matter 
dealt with in our Prior Decision, for the purpose of levying upon his wages, 
a technique which has no application other than in the enforcement of a 
money judgment. There is no suggestion by plaintiff that defendant can 
rander performance under the affirmative obligation other than by the pay-
ment of money. We therefore conclude that plaintiff has a claim against 
defendant within the meaning of 11 U. S. C. § 101(4), and that defendant 
owes plaintiff a debt within the meaning of 11 U. S. C. § 101(11). Fur-
thermore, we have concluded that that debt is dischargeable." 29 Bankr. 
Rep., at 818. 
8 
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ested is a money payment to effectuate the Chem-Dyne 
cleanup." 
"The impact of its attempt to realize upon Kovacs' in-
come or property cannot be concealed by legerdemain or 
linguistic gymnastics. Kovacs cannot personally clean 
up the waste he wrongfully released into Ohio waters. 
He cannot perform the affirmative obligations properly 
imposed upon him by the State court except by paying 
money or transferring over his own financial resources. 
The State of Ohio has acknowledged this by its steadfast 
pursuit of payment as an alternative to personal per-
formance." 717 F. 2d, at 987-988. 
As we understand it, the C~f Appeal~_held that, in the 
circumstances, the clean-up duty ha been reduced to a on-
etary ob~n. - --
We do not disturb this jud~ent. The injunction surely 
obliged Kovacs to c ean up t e site. But when he failed to do 
so, rather than prosecute Kovacs under the environmental 
laws or bring civil or criminal contempt proceedings, the 
State secured the appointment of a ~eiver, who was or-
dered to take possession of all of Kovacs' non-exempt assets 
as well as the assets of the corporate defendants and to com-
ply with the injunction entered against Kovacs. As wise as 
this course may have been, it dis ossessed Kovacs, removed 
his authority over the site, and diveste<rllim Of assets that 
might have been used by him to clean up the property. Fur-
thermore, when the bankruptcy trustee sought to recover 
Kovacs' assets from the receiver, the latter sought an injunc-
tion against such action. Although Kovacs had been ordered 
to "cooperate" with the receiver, he was disabled by the 
receivership from personally taking charge of and carrying 
out the removal of wastes from the property. What the re-
ceiver wanted from Kovacs after bankruptcy was the money 
to defray clean-up costs. At oral argument in this Court, the 
State's counsel conceded that after the receiver was ap-
83-102G-OPINION 
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pointed, the only performance sought from Kovacs was the 
payment of m~Tr.--of -"Oral~Ar~. Had 
Kovacs urn1shed the necessary funds, either before or after 
bankruptcy, there seems little doubt that the receiver and 
the State would have been satisfied. On the facts before it, i 
and with the receiver in control of the site, 10 we cannot fault 
the Court of Appeals for concluding that the clean-up order 
had been c nverted into <!_n obl~tion to Q_ay money, an ob-
ligation that was iSChargeahle in bankruptcy. 11 ;,:_____;, 
~ ---------=~~ 
' IV 
It is well to emphasize what we have not decided. First, 
we do not suggest that Kovacs' discharge will shield him from 
prosecution for having violated the environmental laws of 
Ohio or for criminal contempt for not performing his obliga-
tions under the injunction- prior to bankruptcy. Second, had 
a fine or monetary penalty for violation of state law been im-
posed on Kovacs prior to bankruptcy, § 523(a)(7) forecloses 
any suggestion that his obligation to pay the fine or penalty 
would be discharged in bankruptcy. Third, we do not ad-
10 We were advised at oral argument that the receiver at that time was 
still in possession of the site, although he was contemplating terminating 
the receivership. Tr. of Oral Argument, 4, 56-57. We were also advised 
that it was difficult to tell exactly who owned the property as 500 Ford 
Boulevard and that although the trustee did not formally abandon the 
property, he did not seek to take possession of it. Tr. 55, 58. 
11 The State relies on Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Department of Environmental 
Resources, 733 F. 2d 267 (CA3 1984). There, the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit held that the automatic stay provision of 11 U. S. C. § 362 did 
not apply to the State's seeking an injunction against a bankrupt to require 
compliance with the environmental laws. This was held to be an effort to 
enforce the police power statutes of the state, not a suit to enforce a money 
judgment. But in that case, there had been no appointment of a receiver 
who had the duty to comply with the state law and who was seeking money 
from the bankrupt. The automatic stay provision does not apply to suits 
to enforce the regulatory statutes of the state, but the enforcement of such 
a judgment by seeking money from the bankrupt-what the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit concluded was involved in this case-is another 
matter. 
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dress what the legal consequences would have been had 
Kovacs taken bankruptcy before a receiver had been ap-
pointed and a trustee had been designated with the usual du-
ties of a bankruptcy trustee. 12 Fourth, we do not hold that 
the injunction against bringing further toxic wastes on the 
premises or against any conduct that will contribute to the 
pollution of the site or the State's waters is dischargeable in 
bankruptcy; we here address, as did the Court of Appeals, 
only the affirmative duty to clean up the site and the duty to 
pay money to that end. Finally, we do not question that 
anyone in possession of the site-whether it is Kovacs or an-
other in the event the receivership is liquidated and the 
12 The commencement of a case under the Bankruptcy Act creates an es-
tate which, with limited exceptions, consists of all of the debtor's property 
wherever located. 11 U. S. C. § 541. The trustee, who is to be appointed 
promptly in Chapter 7 cases, is charged with the duty of collecting andre-
ducing the property of the estate and is to be accountable for all of such 
property. 11 U. S. C. § 704. A custodian of the debtor's property ap-
pointed before commencement of the case is required to deliver the debt-
or's property in his custody to the trustee, unless the bankruptcy court 
concludes that the interest of creditors would be better served by permit-
ting the custodian to continue in possession and control of the property. 
11 U. S. C. § 543. After notice and hearing, the trustee may abandon any 
property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of incon-
sequential value to the estate. 11 U. S. C. § 554. Such abandonment is 
to the person having the possessory interest in the property. S. Rep. No. 
95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1978). Property that is scheduled but not 
administered is deemed abandoned. 11 U. S. C. § 554(c). Had no re-
ceiver been appointed prior to Kovacs' bankruptcy, the trustee would have 
been charged with the duty of collecting Kovacs' non-exempt property and 
administering it. If the site at issue were Kovacs' property, the trustee 
would shortly determine whether it was of value to the estate. If the 
property was worth more than the costs of bringing it into compliance with 
state law, the trustee would undoubtedly sell it for its net value, and the 
buyer would clean up the property, in which event whatever obligation 
Kovacs might have had to clean up the property would have been satisfied. 
If the property were worth less than the cost of cleanup, the trustee would 
likely abandon it to its prior owner, who would have to comply with the 
state environmental law to the extent of his or its ability. 
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trustee abandons the property, or a vendee from the receiver 
or the bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environ-
mental laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or 
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of the 
State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions. As ) 
the case comes to us, however, Kovacs has been dispossessed 
and the State seeks to enforce his clean-up obligation by a 
money judgment. 




To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Dan 
Re: JUSTICE WHITE'S First Draft of Ohio v. Kovacs, No. 83-1020. 
I see three difficulties with JUSTICE WHITE'S opinion, 
but I am not sure that they should keep you from joining. Fi~ 
JUSTICE WHITE slides around the serious mootness problem in this 
case by saying merely that "[w] e perceive nothing feigned or 
frivolous about the State's submission." This is hardly an an-
swer to Kovacs's argument and the clear language of the judgment 
entry that he signed. Given that the Court wants to decide the 
merits now, however, I am not sure that writing separately on 
this point would be a good idea. It would merely point out a 
problem that readers would probably otherwise be unaware of and 
perhaps complicate mootness doctrine for future cases. On the 
~ I disagree with JUSTICE WHITE'S interpretation 
of the statute. The real question posed by the case is whether 
Kovacs's failure to clean up the dump site constituted a "breach 
of performance .•. giving rise to a right to payment." As I said 
in my bench memo, I believe that legislative history and the lan-
... .. 
'· 
guage of the statute indicate the _opposite of JUSTICE WHITE'S 
~ --- ' 
result. This is a~ittedly a ~lose _~n, however, and I am !I 
not~ure how ~d be~~y writing separately. JUSTIC~ 
WHITE'S current draft is so vague in its discussion of the two 
relevant statutory terms that it might not affect the lower 
courts' interpretation of them in situations outside the narrow 
one presented here. 
Third, JUSTICE WHITE places much importance on the pres-
ence of a }! us~ in this ca; e. On the one hand, this greatly 
limits the case--which is a good idea considering how messy it 
-is. On the other hand, giving this distinction any importance 
encourages potential bankrupts not to carry out their legal obli-
gations. If they stall, the State will presumably appoint a 
trustee and their obligations will thus be dischargeable later. 
This strikes me as bad policy, but again I am not sure it is 
worth quarreling over. 
These are all close judgment calls which my inexperience 
prevents me from making with much confidence. If pushed, howev-
er, I would hesitantly recommend joining the opinion. You might 
consider waiting a bit to see if other Justices see some of these 
same problems and feel strongly about them. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
_.uprenu Qfttm:t ttf tlft ~ttb' _.bttt• 
Jfu~. ~. elf. 20~~~ 
December 18, 1984 
Re: 83-1020 - Ohio v. Kovacs 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
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December 18, 1984 
83-1020 Ohio v. Kovacs 
Dear Byron: 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.inprtmt Clf"" o:f t!rt ~tb .itatu 
-ulthtghnt, ~. Clf. 20~~~ 
December 19, 1984 
Re: No. 83-1020 Ohio v. Kovacs 
Dear Byron, 
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CHAMBE:RS or 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Dear Byron, 
.i~ttlttt (!}curt of t4t ~ittb" .ibdt.e-
Jia#ftUtgton:, ~. (!}. 2llgi'l~ 
December 19, 1984 
No. 83-1020 Ohio v. Kovacs 
Please join me. I will also be circulating a 
brief separate concurrence mentioning that in my view state 
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.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
December 27, 1984 
Re: No. 83-1020-0hio v. Kovacs 
Dear Byron: 
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THECHIEF.JusTrcE December 28, 1984 
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Re: No. 83-1020, Ohio v. Kovacs 
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